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ABSTRACT
This Article uses the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit’s divided decision in Otto v. City of Boca Raton in late 2020
as a springboard for examining battles in First Amendment
jurisprudence over proof of causation of harm and the level of
deference owed to the judgments of learned societies. A two-judge
majority held in Otto that a pair of local ordinances banning speechbased conversion therapy on minors violated the First Amendment,
with those measures failing the rigorous strict scrutiny standard of
review. Crucial to the majority’s ruling was its conclusion that
insufficient evidence exists that conversion therapy—also known as
sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE)—harms minors.
Conversely, the Otto dissent found “strong evidence” of injury and,
in so doing, afforded significant deference to the views of several
learned organizations such as the American Academy of Pediatrics.
The dissent, in turn, would have upheld the measures under strict
scrutiny. This Article explores how this cleft in Otto regarding proof
of causation of harm and the deference due to learned organizations,
particularly when conducting scientific experiments is impossible
because of ethical concerns, reflects the U.S. Supreme Court’s
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disagreement over those issues a decade ago in the violent video
game case of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association. This
Article contends that Brown’s stringent mandate of proving a direct
causal link between regulated speech and the harm attributed to it
allows conservative-leaning judges, including the ones in the Otto
majority who were appointed by former President Donald J. Trump,
to weaponize the First Amendment in the clash over conversion
therapy. The legacy of Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in
Brown thus stretches beyond regulating entertainment-oriented
media products, such as video games, to fundamentally impact
larger cultural and legal battles over sexual orientation and the
dignity of LGBTQ minors.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 766
I. CONVERSION THERAPY AND LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO THWART
IT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LANDSCAPE PRIOR TO OTTO .. 775
II BROWN AND THE DIRECT CAUSAL LINK STANDARD: AN
IMPOSSIBLE LEVEL OF PROOF IN SOME INSTANCES?............... 787
III. ANOTHER STEP TOWARD WEAPONIZING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT? A CRITICAL AND CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE
OTTO MAJORITY’S EVIDENTIARY APPROACH ......................... 795
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 808
INTRODUCTION
In November 2020, a fractured three-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Otto v. City of Boca
Raton struck down, for violating the First Amendment guarantee of
free expression, two local ordinances prohibiting Florida-licensed
therapists from performing sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE)
on minors. 1 The decision stands in stark contrast to—and, more
significantly, creates a split of authority ripe for U.S. Supreme Court
1. 981 F.3d 854, 859 (11th Cir. 2020) (“We hold that the challenged
ordinances violate the First Amendment because they are content-based regulations
of speech that cannot survive strict scrutiny.”). The First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free
Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly 100 years ago through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties applicable for
governing the actions of state and local government entities and officials. Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). See generally infra notes 3–7 and
accompanying text and Part I (providing an overview of SOCE and controversies
relating to SOCE).
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review with—earlier rulings by both the Third and Ninth Circuits
that had rejected First Amendment challenges to similar anti-SOCE
laws in New Jersey and California, respectively. 2
SOCE, also known as reparative or conversion therapy, are
intended to transform homosexual or bisexual individuals into
heterosexuals. 3 They are highly controversial.4 To wit, a task force of
the American Psychological Association (APA) concluded in 2009
that SOCE “are unlikely to be successful and involve some risk of
harm, contrary to the claims of SOCE practitioners and advocates.”5
Furthermore, a 2019 survey of more than 34,000 LGBTQ youth
found that those who had undergone conversion therapy were twice
as likely to have attempted suicide than those who did not.6
Additionally, today there is “a virtual medical consensus on the
psychological ill effects of conversion therapy.” 7
2. See King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014);
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2014). See also Clay Calvert,
Testing the First Amendment Validity of Laws Banning Sexual Orientation Change
Efforts on Minors: What Level of Scrutiny Applies After Becerra and Does a
Proportionality Approach Provide a Solution?, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 21 (2019)
(providing an overview of the rulings by both the Third Circuit in King, 767 F.3d
216, and the Ninth Circuit in Pickup, 740 F.3d 1208).
3. See Madison Higbee et al., Conversion Therapy in the Southern United
States: Prevalence and Experiences of the Survivors, J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1, 1 (2020)
(noting that conversion therapy is also known “as reparative therapy, sexual
reorientation therapy [SRT], sexual orientation change efforts [SOCE], ex-gay
therapy, or gender identity change efforts [GICE] when directed toward gender
minority individuals”). This Article uses the terms conversion therapy and SOCE
interchangeably. See also Casey Gamboni et al., Prohibiting Versus Discouraging:
Exploring Mental Health Organizations Varied Stances on Sexual Orientation
Change Efforts (SOCE), 46 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 96, 96–97 (2018).
4. See Kate Bradshaw et al., Sexual Orientation Change Efforts Through
Psychotherapy for LGBQ Individuals Affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, 41 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 391, 392 (2015) (describing the
promotion of SOCE as “controversial”); cf. John R. Blosnich et al., Sexual
Orientation Change Efforts, Adverse Childhood Experiences, and Suicide Ideation
and Attempt Among Sexual Minority Adults, United States, 2016–2018, 110 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1024, 1029 (2020) (“Major professional medical and health services
organizations condemn the practice of SOCE.”).
5. Am. Psych. Ass’n, Report of the American Psychological Association
Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation, at v (2009)
[hereinafter APA REPORT].
6. See THE TREVOR PROJECT, NATIONAL SURVEY ON LGBTQ YOUTH
MENTAL HEALTH 2019, 1 (2019).
7. Sacha M. Coupet, Valuing All Identities Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate:
The Case for Inclusivity as a Civic Virtue in K-12, 27 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 63
(2020). See also Nancy J. Knauer, The Politics of Eradication and the Future of
LGBT Rights, 21 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 633 (2020) (“All major medical
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Yet, in the face of such grave reservations about SOCE’s
apparent lack of efficacy and its alleged harms, a two-judge majority
in Otto concluded that the anti-SOCE ordinances adopted by Palm
Beach County, Florida and the city of Boca Raton, which is situated
in Palm Beach County, breached therapists Robert Otto and Julie
Hamilton’s First Amendment speech rights. 8 The pair engage in “talk
therapy” with “minors who have unwanted same-sex attraction or
unwanted gender identity issues.”9 Although denying the power to
actually alter minors’ sexual orientation through such speech-based
efforts, Otto and Hamilton contend their methods can “reduce samesex behavior and attraction and eliminate . . . confusion over gender
identity.” 10
Crucial to the Otto majority’s conclusion in the therapists’
favor—a ruling that immediately drew the APA’s wrath11—were its
sequential findings that the anti-SOCE ordinances:
(1) regulated speech, not conduct, and thus implicated the
First Amendment; 12
associations have rejected the practice of attempting to ‘change’ sexual
orientation.”).
8. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 859 (11th Cir. 2020).
9. Id. at 860.
10. See id.
11. APA President Sandra L. Shullman declared the ruling “wrongheaded,” asserting that it “may well result in harm to patients, especially minors who
are often subjected to this type of therapy against their will.” Press Release, Am.
Psych. Ass’n, APA Criticizes Appeals Court Ruling Overturning Local Ban on SoCalled Conversion Therapy (Nov. 22, 2020), https://www.apa.org/
news/press/releases/2020/11/conversion-therapy-ban-ruling [https://perma.cc/Z89PZVDF].
12. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 861 (“Nor can the local governments evade the
First Amendment’s ordinary presumption against content-based speech restrictions
by saying that the plaintiffs’ speech is actually conduct.”). This conclusion was vital
for allowing Otto and Hamilton’s case to proceed because there is a pivotal
dichotomy separating First Amendment protected speech from unprotected conduct.
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that “a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at
expression [] is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all”); see also R. Randall
Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine, 52 Ind. L.
Rev. 355, 356 (2019) (“By its terms, the First Amendment proscribes only
government action ‘abridging the freedom of speech,’ not conduct. Governmental
regulations of conduct, therefore, are outside of the ambit of the First
Amendment.”). In brief, “[t]he function of the conduct/speech inquiry requires
courts to initially decide whether the First Amendment is implicated at all.” John G.
Wrench & Arif Panju, A Counter-Majoritarian Bulwark: The First Amendment and
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(2) imposed content-based regulations on speech and thereby
necessitated examination under the often-fatal strict scrutiny
standard of review in order to pass constitutional muster; 13
and
(3) failed to survive strict scrutiny not only because there
was insufficient scientific evidence of harm caused by purely
speech based SOCE, but also because the opinions and
conclusions of multiple professional organizations, including

Professional Speech in the Wake of NIFLA v. Becerra, 24 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 453,
471 (2020).
Indeed, in considering a First Amendment free-speech challenge to California’s antiSOCE statute, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2014 concluded
that SOCE constitute conduct—a form of professional practice and treatment—and
not speech and thus they do “not implicate the First Amendment.” Pickup v. Brown,
740 F.3d 1208, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “the fact that
speech may be used to carry out those therapies does not turn the regulation of
conduct into a regulation of speech.” Id. at 1229. The Ninth Circuit’s resolution of
the threshold speech-versus-conduct question in Pickup thus stands in direct
opposition to the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion in Otto.
It should be noted, for purposes of clarity, that in some instances conduct is treated
as speech for purposes of the First Amendment. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,
358 (2003) (“The First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive
conduct as well as to actual speech.”). For example, burning the American flag as a
form of symbolic protest is protected by the First Amendment. See Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (concluding that Gregory Lee Johnson’s burning
of an American flag during a political demonstration while the Republican National
Convention was taking place in Dallas in 1984 “was conduct ‘sufficiently imbued
with elements of communication’ . . . to implicate the First Amendment”) (quoting
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).
13. A statute regulating speech is content based if it “applies to particular
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). Statutes can be content based
either on their face—by their terms—or, even if facially neutral, if they were
adopted because the government disagreed with the message being conveyed. See
id. at 163–64. To survive strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate two
points: first, that it possesses a compelling interest in regulating the speech in
question and, second, that the statute under review is so narrowly tailored that it
restricts no more speech than is necessary to serve the compelling interest. See
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011); United States v. Playboy
Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). The term “often-fatal” is appropriate because
strict scrutiny leads “to almost certain legal condemnation” of a statute. Reed, 576
U.S. at 174 (Breyer, J., concurring). See Otto, 981 F.3d at 867–68 (“These
ordinances are content-based regulations of speech and must satisfy strict
scrutiny.”). This part of the Otto ruling fully comports with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recently reiterated principle that “[c]ontent-based laws are subject to strict
scrutiny.” Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020).
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the APA, against SOCE were inadequate substitutes for
scientific research proving that SOCE are injurious.14

Regarding the pivotal third finding about the lack of scientific
evidence of SOCE-induced harm, Judge Britt Grant, a 2018
President Donald J. Trump appointee, writing on behalf of herself
and Judge Barbara Lagoa, a 2019 Trump appointee, focused on the
APA task force report noted earlier in this Article.15 Specifically,
Judge Grant emphasized that the report “concedes that ‘nonaversive
and recent approaches to SOCE have not been rigorously evaluated.’
In fact, it found a ‘complete lack’ of ‘rigorous recent prospective
research’ on SOCE.” 16 Indeed, the APA task force’s report states that
“recent studies do not provide valid causal evidence of the efficacy
of SOCE or of its harm.” 17 The report adds that “we cannot conclude
how likely it is that harm will occur from SOCE.” 18 Judge Grant thus
reasoned that “such equivocal conclusions” fail to meet the demands
of strict scrutiny. 19 Furthermore, she opined that this stringent
standard of review “cannot be satisfied by professional societies’
opposition to speech.” 20
In other words, the opinions and judgments of learned societies
and professional organizations about harm purportedly wrought by
speech cannot serve, at least under the First Amendment, as
evidentiary proxies or surrogates for rigorous studies demonstrating

14. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 868–70.
15. See Hon. Britt C. Grant, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIR.,
https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/judges/hon-britt-c-grant
[https://perma.cc/A5TRBKCH] (last visited Oct 11, 2021); Hon. Barbara Lagoa, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIR., https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/hon-barbara-lagoa [https://
perma.cc/SX9L-48U5] (last visited Oct. 11, 2021); Otto, 981 F.3d at 868–69. Judge
Grant explained why she concentrated on this report:
We focus our attention on the APA’s 2009 task force report because it
“performed a systematic review of the peer-reviewed literature” to assess
SOCE. Many of the other reports cited by the dissent—including those
from the World Health Organization and the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services—primarily rely on the APA’s task force report to
draw their own conclusions about SOCE. So we choose instead to discuss
the APA’s report directly.
Id. at 869 n.8.
16. Id. at 868.
17. See APA REPORT, supra note 5, at 42 (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. Otto, 981 F.3d at 869.
20. Id.
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injury. 21 The end result of the majority’s approach to the proof-ofharm issue was that while Palm Beach County and Boca Raton had
identified an ostensibly compelling interest—the level of
governmental interest required under strict scrutiny—in protecting
minors from harm, they had failed to prove that there was, in fact, a
compelling interest in shielding minors from SOCE. 22
Importantly for purpose of this Article, in articulating the
evidentiary demands imposed by the strict scrutiny test, Judges Grant
and Lagoa relied partly on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n. 23 In Brown, the Court
applied strict scrutiny and struck down a California statute restricting
minors’ access to rent and purchase violent video games. 24 The Court
concluded that California failed to demonstrate the “high degree of
necessity we have described as a compelling state interest” in
protecting minors from such media artifacts.25 In reaching this result,
Justice Antonin Scalia reasoned for the majority that the social
science evidence offered by California did not “show a direct causal
link between violent video games and harm to minors.” 26 Justice
Scalia drew a vital distinction between the concepts of correlation
and causation. 27 He stressed that the studies relied on by the state
“show[ed] at best some correlation between exposure to violent

21. See id. at 869–70.
22. See id. at 868–69 (“[I]t is not enough for the defendants to identify a
compelling interest.”). See also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310, 340 (2010) (noting that strict scrutiny requires the government to prove that
there is a compelling interest in restricting the speech in question).
23. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 868 (citing Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564
U.S. 786, 794–95 (2011)).
24. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 789, 805 (noting that the statute banned the sale
or rental to minors of “violent video games” and concluding that it “cannot survive
strict scrutiny”).
25. See id. at 804.
26. See id. at 799.
27. See id. at 800. A correlation is:
[a]n empirical relationship between two variables such that (1) changes in
one are associated with changes in the other, or (2) particular attributes of
one variable are associated with particular attributes of the
other. . . . Correlation in and of itself does not constitute a causal
relationship between the two variables, but it is one criterion of causality.
EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 94 (15th ed. 2020). A causal
relationship, in contrast, not only requires that the variables be correlated, but that
the cause occurs in time prior to the effect and “the effect cannot be explained in
terms of some third variable” that would otherwise render the relationship spurious.
Id.
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entertainment and minuscule real-world effects.”28 In other words,
the studies did “not prove that violent video games cause minors to
act aggressively.” 29 The year after Brown, the Supreme Court
reinforced the principle that strict scrutiny requires “a direct causal
link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be
prevented.” 30 The majority in Otto, in turn, cited Brown for dual
propositions: (1) content-based regulations of speech are rarely
permissible, 31 and (2) “[t]he government carries the burden of proof
and, ‘because it bears the risk of uncertainty, ambiguous proof will
not’ satisfy the ‘demanding standard’ it must meet.”32 As the Otto
majority interpreted this latter command from Brown, “[p]ermitting
uncertain evidence to satisfy strict scrutiny would blur the lines that
separate it from lesser tiers of scrutiny—that is, intermediate scrutiny
and rational basis review.” 33
The alleged absence of thorough research demonstrating that
SOCE cause harm signaled to Judges Grant and Lagoa that the only
possible remaining government justification for barring SOCE was
that the practice embodies offensive and disagreeable viewpoints
about sexual orientation and gender. 34 Quoting a U.S. Supreme Court
decision that safeguarded the right to burn the American flag as a
form of symbolic political protest, the Otto majority explained that
the First Amendment flatly forbids such an offensive-conveyance-ofideas rationale for censoring speech.35 This sealed the
unconstitutional fate of the Palm Beach County and Boca Raton
ordinances. 36
Judge Beverly Martin, who was appointed to the Eleventh
Circuit in 2010 by President Barack Obama and retired from her
28. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 800 (emphasis added).
29. See id.
30. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012).
31. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 868 (11th Cir. 2020).
32. Id. (quoting Brown, 564 U.S. at 799–800).
33. Id. at 869 n.9.
34. See id. at 872 (discussing the principle that the expression of an idea
cannot be prohibited only because the idea is offensive).
35. See id. (concluding that “[t]he challenged ordinances violate [the]
principle” from Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989), that the government
has no power to bar the expression of ideas because society deems them offensive or
disagreeable); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (“If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”); see also discussion supra note 12 (addressing Johnson).
36. See Otto, 981 F.3d. at 872 (“The challenged ordinances violate that
principle, and the district court should have enjoined their enforcement.”).
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judgeship in late 2021, penned a dissent. 37 As with the majority,
Judge Martin applied strict scrutiny to test the ordinances’ validity. 38
Unlike the majority, however, she concluded the measures survived
that standard of review.39 In doing so, Judge Martin also embraced a
very different approach to the evidentiary question regarding harm
caused by SOCE and, in the process, deemed the evidence sufficient
under strict scrutiny. 40 Specifically, she did more than simply rely on
the APA task force report, although she did focus on aspects of it
indicating harms caused by SOCE that the Otto majority ignored.41
Judge Martin also turned to the opinions of other professional
associations.42 Judge Martin both: (1) recognized the ethical
impossibility of conducting controlled experiments on minors
involving SOCE, 43 and (2) was willing, unlike the majority, to defer
to the conclusions of multiple professional associations regarding the
negative effects of SOCE.44
37. See id. (Martin, J., dissenting). See also Martin, Beverly Baldwin, FED.
JUD. CTR. https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/martin-beverly-baldwin [https://
perma.cc/2Q5H-T3YM] (last visited Oct. 11, 2021). After retiring from the Eleventh
Circuit in September 2021, Judge Martin became executive director of the New
York University School of Law’s Center on Civil Justice. See Press Release, NYU
Law News, Judge Beverly Martin to Join Center on Civil Justice as Executive
Director (Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.law.nyu.edu/news/judge-beverly-martin-joinscenter-civil-justice [https://perma.cc/R3XW-VLSA].
38. See Otto, 981 F.3d. at 873 (Martin, J., dissenting) (stating that the strict
scrutiny test was applied to the ordinances).
39. See id. (holding that the ordinances satisfied strict scrutiny).
40. See id. at 875 (“As the majority views it, there is ‘insufficient evidence’
that makes it impossible to conclude that SOCE is so harmful as to merit regulation.
. . . I disagree.”) (citation omitted).
41. As Judge Martin wrote:
Despite these findings about the harm caused by SOCE, the majority
opinion relies instead on a single statement in the Task Force Report that
“rigorous recent prospective research” on SOCE has not been done. . . .
But what studies have been done “show that enduring change to an
individual’s sexual orientation is uncommon,” and that there is, in fact,
already “evidence to indicate that individuals experience harm from
SOCE.”
Id. at 876 (citations omitted).
42. See id. (noting findings by American Academy of Pediatrics, an office
of the World Health Organization, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration).
43. See id. at 877 (“To be clear, the very research the majority opinion
seems to demand is ‘not ethically permissible’ to conduct.”).
44. See id. at 878 (“When it comes to regulation of allegedly harmful
medical practices, the judgment of professional organizations strikes me as quite
relevant.”).
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In brief, the Otto majority and dissent not only adopted
different tacks when addressing the question of harm caused by
SOCE and whether there was sufficient evidence of it to prove a
compelling governmental interest, but they also dissimilarly treated
the opinions and judgments about SOCE of learned professional
groups. 45 This Article illustrates how the Eleventh Circuit’s divided
decision in Otto reveals lingering problems stemming from the U.S.
Supreme Court’s treatment of social science evidence and the
judgments of professional organizations on the question of speechcaused harms a decade ago in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass’n. 46 This Article addresses how the Justices in Brown, in fact,
fractured over these very same issues. 47
Furthermore, this Article later takes a critical turn. It asserts
that the true legacy of Justice Scalia’s decidedly rigid and
challenging standard regarding proof of direct causation of harm via
scientific evidence now plays out far beyond the make-believe,
entertainment-driven world of the video games that were at issue in
Brown. 48 Specifically, the decision now thwarts legislative efforts,
such as those in Palm Beach County and Boca Raton, to squelch
speech that arguably attacks the core human dignity of children by
making them question and doubt the veracity of their own sexual
orientation. 49 Conservative-leaning jurists now can wield Justice
Scalia’s opinion as a weapon to destroy legislation designed to shield
LGBTQ minors from injury, thereby transforming Brown from a
decision ostensibly about standards for the neutral and detached
evaluation of scientific evidence into one that powerfully plays a
deregulatory role in the cultural wars over sexual orientation.50
Part I of this Article initially provides a primer on conversion
therapy, including an overview of the spate of legislative efforts
during the past ten years to bar licensed therapists from practicing it
on minors. 51 Part I also summarizes two key federal appellate court
rulings about such measures prior to the Eleventh Circuit’s 2020

45. See supra notes 31–42 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text and see infra Part II
(addressing Brown).
47. See infra Part II (addressing the disagreements among the Justices in
Brown).
48. See infra Part III.
49. See infra Part III.
50. See infra Part III.
51. See infra Part I.

Calvert

Weaponizing Proof of Harm

775

decision in Otto. 52 Part II analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011
decision in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n. 53 Specifically,
it focuses on the Brown Court’s articulation of the strict scrutiny test,
including the Court’s rigorous threshold for proving a compelling
governmental interest when using social science evidence.54 Part II
also addresses Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent in Brown, describing
his much more flexible, holistic approach to scientific evidence and
the deference Breyer afforded to the opinions of both learned
professional organizations and lawmakers when it came to whether
the regulated speech caused harm. 55
Part III delves deeper and more critically into the use of
Brown’s evidentiary standard in First Amendment cases such as
Otto, exploring how it can become a potent deregulatory tool for
conservative-leaning jurists. 56 Part III also situates Otto firmly within
the larger context of ideological friction today among the Justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court over the use of heightened scrutiny in First
Amendment cases pivoting on the often divisive topics of abortion
and labor unions. 57 Finally, Part IV concludes by contending that the
deployment of Brown’s standard in cases such as Otto, where
conducting causal-attribution experiments on minors is unfeasible,
must be adjusted to account for this predicament, and that greater
deference is due to the conclusions of learned professional
organizations.58
I. Conversion Therapy and Legislative Efforts to Thwart It: A Brief
Overview of the Landscape Prior to Otto
Homosexuality is no longer considered a mental illness.59
However, the core belief underlying conversion therapy “is that
same-sex attractions are pathological and demand reorientation back
52. See infra Part I.
53. See infra Part II.
54. See infra Part II.
55. See infra Part II.
56. See infra Part III.
57. See infra Part III.
58. See infra Part IV.
59. See Tia Powell & Edward Stein, Legal and Ethical Concerns about
Sexual Orientation Change Efforts, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.–Oct. 2014, at 33
(noting that in 1973, “homosexuality was eliminated from the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the
authoritative catalogue of mental illnesses used in the United States and throughout
much of the world”).
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to heteronormative expectations of sexuality.”60 Conversion therapy
has been practiced in various forms for more than 100 years, but the
most common method today is talk therapy—a speech-based
treatment that raises First Amendment concerns regarding freedom
of expression when the government restricts it in cases such as in
Otto—rather than some form of behavioral or physical treatment.61
Behavioral and physical methods, sometimes known as aversion
therapy, included “shocking the patient when viewing images of a
same-sex person, hypnosis, and orgasmic reconditioning.” 62
Conversion therapy’s proponents anecdotally extol its
effectiveness. 63 A 2020 comprehensive review of the scholarly
literature published in Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice,
however, roundly disputes its efficacy. 64 This assessment, in fact,
points out that “[p]articipation in SOCE is associated with numerous
negative effects, including depression, suicidality, decreased selfesteem, and self-hatred.” 65 The same review concludes that “a
significant body of research identifies the negative outcomes of
SOCE.” 66 Conversely, “there [is] insufficient evidence to deem
SOCE effective.” 67

60. Steven P. Meanley et al., Characterizing Experiences of Conversion
Therapy Among Middle-Aged and Older Men Who Have Sex with Men from the
Multicenter AIDS Cohort Study (MACS), 17 SEXUALITY RSCH. & SOC. POL’Y 334,
334 (2020).
61. See Christy Mallory et al., Conversion Therapy and LGBT Youth:
Update, WM. INST. 2 (2019).
62. Nick Clair, “Gay Conversion Therapy” Ban: Protecting Children or
Infringing Rights?, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 550, 555 (2013).
63. See Ian Moss, Ending Reparative Therapy in Minors: An Appropriate
Legislative Response, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 316, 318 (2014) (noting that supporters of
conversion therapy “frequently point to individual stories as evidence of efficacy”).
64. The authors of the literature review observe that:
SOCE do not meet the criteria to be deemed efficacious or wellestablished. The few studies that assert the efficacy of SOCE demonstrate
limited success. Further, they are fraught with methodological flaws that
call their validity into question and prevent the generalizability of the
results. Meanwhile, there are many contrasting studies that detail the
numerous harms and negative outcomes associated with SOCE.
Amy Przeworski et al., A Systematic Review of the Efficacy, Harmful Effects, and
Ethical Issues Related to Sexual Orientation Change Efforts, CLINICAL PSYCH.: SCI.
& PRAC. 81, 94 (2020) (advance online publication ahead of print edition),
https://doi.org/10.1111/cpsp.12377 [https://perma.cc/HC9Y-EXVX].
65. Id. at 90.
66. Id. at 95.
67. Id.
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These findings are thoroughly unsurprising. To wit, the 2009
APA task force report noted earlier concluded that “the peer-refereed
empirical research on the outcomes of efforts to alter sexual
orientation provides little evidence of efficacy and some evidence of
harm.” 68 In light of that report, the APA issued a resolution that same
year concluding “there is insufficient evidence to support the use of
psychological interventions to change sexual orientation,” and
“encourag[ing] mental health professionals to avoid misrepresenting
the efficacy of sexual orientation change efforts.” 69
Another learned professional group, the American Psychiatric
Association, issued a statement in 2018 reaffirming its longstanding
stance against conversion therapy, deeming it a “harmful and
discriminatory practice.” 70 In fact, conversion therapy is so widely
condemned—either as ineffective or harmful—that by 2019, not a
single major healthcare professional association supported its
usage. 71 The practice of conversion therapy is now left mainly to
religious practitioners and a few dissenting therapists. 72 The 2020
literature review, referred to earlier in this Part, points out that the
studies that have found SOCE to be effective are problematic in their
designs and methodologies. 73 Troubles include “biased recruitment,
retrospective study designs, lack of generalizability, reliance on
samples of bisexual individuals rather than those who are
predominantly homosexual, and the use of sexual or social
behavior . . . as the outcome instead of sexual orientation.” 74
Despite condemnation from the professional healthcare
community, conversion therapy remains a hotly contested political

68. APA Report, supra note 5, at 35.
69. Appropriate Affirmative Responses to Sexual Orientation Distress and
Change Efforts, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, 31 (Aug. 5, 2009).
70. Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, APA Reiterates Strong
Opposition to Conversion Therapy (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/
newsroom/news-releases/apa-reiterates-strong-opposition-to-conversion-therapy
[https://perma.cc/7KTA-9ZUG].
71. See Tiffany C. Graham, Conversion Therapy: A Brief Reflection on the
History of the Practice and Contemporary Regulatory Efforts, 52 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 419, 423 (2019) (“Today, there are no longer any major healthcare professional
associations which support the practice of conversion therapy.”).
72. See Marie-Amélie George, Expressive Ends: Understanding
Conversion Therapy Bans, 68 ALA. L. REV. 793, 810 (2017).
73. See Przeworski et al., supra note 64, at 82.
74. Id.
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issue. 75 For example, the Republican Party’s 2020 platform included
language supporting the right of parents to place their children in
conversion therapy. 76 In contrast, a leading LGBTQ organization in
November 2020 asked then President-elect Joseph Biden to place
banning conversion therapy on his agenda.77 The administration of
former President Barack Obama had also opposed conversion
therapy and called for its termination. 78
Efforts to ban SOCE in the United States are relatively recent.79
In 2012, California became the first state to prohibit conversion
therapy on minors. 80 Its statute bluntly provides that “[u]nder no
circumstances shall a mental health provider engage in sexual
orientation change efforts with a patient under 18 years of age.”81 In
2013, New Jersey became the second state to bar SOCE on minors.82
Similar to California’s law restricting minors’ access to SOCE, that
law forbids state-licensed counselors from “engag[ing] in sexual
orientation change efforts with a person under 18 years of age.” 83

75. See Reid J. Epstein, The G.O.P. Delivers Its 2020 Platform. It’s From
2016., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/
25/us/politics/republicans-platform.html [https://perma.cc/6AAN-7WY7].
76. See id.
77. See Sydney Ember, Progressives’ Wish List for Biden Starts with
(Nov.
11,
2020),
Warren
and
Sanders,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/us/politics/warren-sanders-biden-cabinet.html
[https://perma.cc/QP36-HLN7] (reporting that “the Human Rights Campaign, one of
the nation’s largest advocacy organizations for L.G.B.T.Q. people,” requested that
Biden “end conversion therapy”).
78. See Caitlin Ryan et al., Parent-Initiated Sexual Orientation Change
Efforts with LGBT Adolescents: Implications for Young Adult Mental Health and
Adjustment, 67 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 159, 162 (2020).
79. See Wynter K. Miller & Benjamin E. Berkman, The Future of
Physicians’ First Amendment Freedom: Professional Speech in an Era of Radically
Expanded Prenatal Genetic Testing, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577, 635 (2019).
80. See id. (“In September 2012, Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill
1172, making California the first state to ban state-licensed therapists from
performing SOCE on any patient under eighteen years of age.”).
81. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2013).
82. See Soumya Karlamangla, New Jersey Court Ruling Another Blow to
(Nov.
10,
2013),
Gay
Conversion
Therapies,
L.A.
TIMES
https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-gay-conversion-new-jerseyban-20131109-story.html (“In August, New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie signed into
law a bill outlawing the controversial therapies, making the Garden State the second
to do so after California.”).
83. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1–55 (West 2021).
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Seven years later, the legislative tide had risen steadily higher
against practicing SOCE on minor patients.84 Specifically, in March
2020, Virginia became the twentieth state to outlaw SOCE on
minors. 85 In signing that measure into law, Governor Ralph Northam
denounced conversion therapy as a dangerous and harmful practice
“based in discriminatory junk-science.” 86 In addition to statewide
statutes, at least thirty-five municipalities by 2020 had enacted laws
forbidding conversion therapy on minors. 87 Legislators targeting
SOCE view the controversial practice, Professor Jane Bambauer
writes, “as the worst sort of snake oil—as a promise that is destined
to fail, in an attempt to treat a condition that is not even an
ailment.”88
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit’s 2020 ruling in Otto striking
down a pair of local anti-SOCE ordinances under strict scrutiny, two
other federal appellate courts had affirmed the constitutionality of
bans against licensed therapists performing SOCE on minors.89
Significantly, those courts—the Ninth Circuit in Pickup v. Brown in
an amended opinion issued in January 2014 and the Third Circuit in
King v. Governor of New Jersey decided later that same year—both
applied tests less rigorous than strict scrutiny when considering First

84. See Joshua Bote, Cities Are Doing More Than States, Federal
Government to Protect LGBTQ Rights, Human Rights Campaign Report Finds,
USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/
12/03/hrc-cities-do-more-than-federal-government-protect-lgbtq-rights/3799252001/
[https://perma.cc/TX57-9URB].
85. See Sandra E. Garcia, Virginia Is First Southern State to Ban
Conversion Therapy for Minors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/us/va-conversion-therapy-ban.html
[https://perma.cc/V9PY-2339].
86. See id.
87. See Bote, supra note 84 (“Thirty-five municipalities have also enacted
laws banning conversion therapy, an improvement of 20% from last year.”).
88. See Jane E. Bambauer, Snake Oil Speech, 93 WASH. L. REV. 73, 100
(2018); see also id. at 74–75 (defining “snake oil” as a “metaphor [that] is used for a
wide range of pseudoscientific claims about products, services, lifestyles, and even
socio-political theories.”); see generally Jane E. Bambauer, JAMES E. ROGERS COLL.
OF L., UNIV. OF ARIZ., https://law.arizona.edu/jane-bambauer (last visited Sept. 9,
2021) [https://perma.cc/2X64-27QZ] (explaining that Bambauer “is a Professor of
Law at the University of Arizona. [Professor Bambauer’s] research assesses the
social costs and benefits of Big Data, and questions the wisdom of many wellintentioned privacy laws”).
89. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (referencing the two decisions
affirming the validity of anti-SOCE statutes in New Jersey and California).
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Amendment challenges to statewide laws in California and New
Jersey, respectively. 90
In Pickup, the Ninth Circuit concluded that SOCE, as regulated
by California, constituted professional conduct, not speech. 91 This
threshold decision proved critical to the court’s ultimate holding
because it rendered nugatory heightened First Amendment scrutiny.92
Recall here that the Eleventh Circuit in Otto reached the opposite
conclusion on the speech-versus-conduct question—a decision that
ultimately started the Eleventh Circuit down the path toward
applying strict scrutiny. 93 In declaring that the California statute
regulated only conduct, the Ninth Circuit in Pickup reasoned that the
measure “bans a form of treatment for minors; it does nothing to
prevent licensed therapists from discussing the pros and cons of
SOCE with their patients.” 94 In other words, therapists could
converse about SOCE as much as they wanted to; they simply could
not perform it on minors. 95
Because it concluded that the California statute regulated
professional conduct, the Ninth Circuit deemed it subject to
“deferential review” under the rational basis standard.96 Rational
basis typically applies when laws regulate economic and social

90. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014); King v.
Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 237 (3d Cir. 2014).
91. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit considered the First Amendment speech rights of professionals along a
continuum, ranging from situations “where a professional is engaged in a public
dialogue” and thus is accorded full constitutional protection, to “the regulation of
professional conduct, where the state’s power is great, even though such regulation
may have an incidental effect on speech.” See id. at 1227–29. See CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2013) (“Under no circumstances shall a mental health
provider engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a patient under 18 years of
age.”).
92. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1230 (“Because [the law] regulates a
professional practice that is not inherently expressive, it does not implicate the First
Amendment.”); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text (addressing the
speech-versus-conduct dichotomy).
93. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (regarding the Eleventh
Circuit’s determination that speech was at issue in Otto).
94. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229.
95. See Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, 97 N.C. L. REV.
843, 858 (2019) (“The court emphasized that physicians remained free to discuss
SOCE with their patients and to express opinions about its advantages and
drawbacks, as long as they did not actually perform the therapy themselves.”).
96. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231.
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welfare.97 It merely requires the government to identify “a legitimate
state interest that . . . [it] could have rationally concluded was
advanced by the statute at issue.” 98
In applying this lenient test, the Ninth Circuit initially
concluded that California possessed the requisite legitimate
interest—namely, safeguarding minors.99 Critically, especially when
contrasted with the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis under strict scrutiny
in Otto, the Ninth Circuit in Pickup stressed that, under rational basis
review, California did not need to prove that SOCE actually caused
harm to minors.100 Instead, the state only needed to demonstrate that
lawmakers’ concern for such possible harm stemming from SOCE
was reasonable.101 The Ninth Circuit found this was the case,
reasoning that while legislators in the Golden State possessed “some
evidence that SOCE is safe and effective, the overwhelming
consensus was that SOCE was harmful and ineffective. On this
record, we have no trouble concluding that the legislature acted
rationally by relying on that consensus.”102 In brief, the Ninth
Circuit’s conclusion that the statute regulated conduct, not speech,
allowed it to dodge the application of strict scrutiny and, in turn, to
avoid Brown v. Entertainment Merchant Ass’n’s rigorous demand for
scientific proof of harm directly caused by SOCE.103 The result was
that California’s law passed rational basis review.104 A future court
97. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and
Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 402 (2016) (asserting that “the
[Supreme] Court has basically gotten it right about when to apply the rational basis
test—using it to analyze government economic regulations and social welfare
legislation when there is no discrimination based on a suspect classification or
infringement of a fundamental right”); Nicholas Walter, The Utility of Rational
Basis Review, 63 VILL. L. REV. 79, 79 (2018) (remarking that rational basis scrutiny
“typically [is] applied to review of economic and social regulations”).
98. Diahann DaSilva, Playing A “Labeling Game”: Classifying Expression
as Conduct as a Means of Circumventing First Amendment Analysis, 56 B.C. L.
REV. 767, 778 (2015).
99. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 1232.
103. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text and infra Part II
(addressing Brown’s evidentiary standards).
104. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1232. In August 2021, U.S. District Judge
Robert J. Bryan followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead in Pickup when he applied rational
basis review to uphold, in the face of a First Amendment free speech challenge, a
law banning conversion therapy on minors in the State of Washington. See Tingley
v. Ferguson, No. 3:21-CV-05359-RJB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164063, at *20–21
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2021).
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with judges sympathetic to LGBTQ minors thus need not follow the
Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Otto; it can escape Brown’s
evidentiary requirements simply by recasting an anti-SOCE mandate
in terms of conduct-based regulation, rather than one implicating
speech and the First Amendment.
Less than one year after the Ninth Circuit issued its amended
ruling in Pickup, the Third Circuit in King v. Governor of New
Jersey upheld the Garden State’s anti-SOCE law, but it took a very
different path in arriving at that result.105 In short, the court held that
New Jersey’s statute did, in fact, regulate speech—not merely
conduct—and therefore triggered First Amendment concerns.106 The
Third Circuit thus differed from the Ninth Circuit in Pickup, which
had applied rational basis review.107 It also differed from the
Eleventh Circuit in Otto, which had adopted strict scrutiny. 108 The
Third Circuit, instead, held that “intermediate scrutiny is the
applicable standard of review in this case. We must uphold [the
statute] if it ‘directly advances’ the government’s interest in
protecting clients from ineffective and/or harmful professional
services, and is ‘not more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest.’” 109 In brief, the Third Circuit selected a standard of review
that falls somewhere in between the arduous strict scrutiny test used
in Otto and the relaxed rational basis standard embraced in Pickup
that the Supreme Court recently described as a “form of minimal
scrutiny [that] is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence.” 110
The Third Circuit reached this determination on scrutiny by
reasoning that when professionals—in this instance, state-licensed
105. Compare 767 F.3d 216, 246 (3d Cir. 2014), with Marc Jonathan Blitz,
Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681,
684 (2016), which notes that, in comparison to the Ninth Circuit in Pickup, “[t]he
Third Circuit . . . had very different reasons for finding New Jersey’s ban on SOCE
therapy constitutional in King v. Governor of New Jersey.”
106. See King, 767 F.3d at 229 (“Thus, we conclude that the verbal
communications that occur during SOCE counseling are not ‘conduct,’ but rather
‘speech’ for purposes of the First Amendment.”).
107. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (noting the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Pickup to apply rational basis review).
108. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting the Third Circuit’s
decision in Otto to apply strict scrutiny).
109. King, 767 F.3d at 237 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
110. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2465 (2018); see Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination:
Malleable Terms Beget Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMMC’N. L. & POL’Y 131, 131
(2008) (describing intermediate scrutiny as “more lenient” than strict scrutiny).
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counselors—speak to clients in their occupational capacities, they do
not receive full First Amendment protection.111 There are, the
appellate court wrote, “special rules for the regulation of speech that
occurs pursuant to the practice of a licensed profession.” 112 The court
explained that professional speech merits closer regulation by the
government partly because of the knowledge imbalance between
professionals, who have expertise, and their clients, who must place
their trust and health in the hands of professionals.113 The
government’s police power to regulate professionals in the name of
protecting clients from harm thus collides with and, in turn, restricts
the First Amendment rights of professionals when they speak while
rendering services to clients. 114 In other words, the government’s
“longstanding authority to protect its citizens from ineffective or
harmful professional practices” takes priority over the First
Amendment speech rights of professionals when they are on the
job. 115
The ramification of this logic for the Third Circuit was that
while content-based laws are generally subject to strict scrutiny, that
principle does not apply in professional speech scenarios such as
King because such expression “enjoys diminished protection.”116 In
ferreting out the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply, the Third
Circuit analogized regulating professional speech to policing
commercial expression. 117 Although commercial speech is a
particular type of content, the regulation of truthful commercial
speech for lawful goods and services is subject only to an
intermediate scrutiny standard of review. 118 Observing that the same
111. See King, 767 F.3d at 232 (concluding “that a licensed professional
does not enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment when speaking as part of
the practice of her profession”).
112. Id. at 231.
113. See id. at 232–33.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 237.
116. Id. at 233; see also Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct.
2335, 2346 (2020) (“Content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny.”).
117. See King, 767 F.3d at 233–35.
118. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
1324, 1339 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has held “that restrictions on
nonmisleading commercial speech regarding lawful activity must withstand
intermediate scrutiny”); see also Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the
Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the Problem that Won’t Go Away, 41
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181, 182 (2007) (observing that “the commercial speech doctrine
creates a category of speech subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment”).

784

Michigan State Law Review

worries regarding an imbalance of knowledge and information
between advertisers and consumers exist as between professionals
and their clients, the Third Circuit concluded that intermediate
scrutiny was also applicable for testing the validating of regulations
on professional speech. 119
In applying intermediate scrutiny to New Jersey’s anti-SOCE
statute, the Third Circuit had no problem determining that the state
possessed a substantial interest in protecting minors from harm
wrought by professionals. 120 Turning to the evidence of harm caused
by SOCE, the Third Circuit noted that under intermediate scrutiny its
role was “merely to determine whether the legislature has ‘drawn
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.’”121 It added
that “a state legislature is not constitutionally required to wait for
conclusive scientific evidence before acting to protect its citizens
from serious threats of harm.” 122 This, of course, is a much more
relaxed and deferential approach to the analysis of evidence than that
embraced by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n. 123 Brown and strict scrutiny demand a direct causal
link between the regulated speech and the harm to be mitigated.124
The Third Circuit’s methodology in King, however, does not. 125
Furthermore, under intermediate scrutiny, the Third Circuit
afforded substantial deference to the opinions and judgments of
professional organizations that the Eleventh Circuit majority in Otto
refused to provide under strict scrutiny. 126 As the Third Circuit
opined, “[l]egislatures are entitled to rely on the empirical judgments
of independent professional organizations that possess specialized
knowledge and experience concerning the professional practice
119. See King, 767 F.3d at 234–35.
120. See id. at 237–38.
121. Id. at 238 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195
(1997)).
122. Id. at 239.
123. See supra notes 22–29 and accompanying text; infra Part II (addressing
Brown’s evidentiary standards).
124. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011)
(referencing the need for a “direct causal link”); United States v. Alverez, 567 U.S.
709, 725 (2012) (referencing the need for a “direct causal link”).
125. See Craig Konnoth, Medicalization and the New Civil Rights, 72 STAN.
L. REV. 1165, 1241–42 (2020) (“The form of First Amendment scrutiny that the
[Third Circuit] applied did not require medical evidence.”).
126. Compare King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 238 (3d Cir.
2014) (allowing for reliance on professional organization judgments), with Otto v.
City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 869 (11th Cir. 2020) (forbidding the reliance on
profession organization judgments).
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under review, particularly when this community has spoken with
such urgency and solidarity on the subject.”127 The court concluded
that the views of multiple organizations, including the APA, about
SOCE amounted to substantial evidence supporting the judgment of
New Jersey lawmakers in enacting the statute.128 The statute, in turn,
survived intermediate scrutiny. 129
In summary, the appellate court opinions in Pickup and King
demonstrate different legal workarounds from the application of
strict scrutiny, including its demanding analysis of scientific
evidence as witnessed in Brown, when considering First Amendment
challenges to anti-SOCE statutes. 130 A major obstacle today facing
these efforts to evade strict scrutiny and Brown, however, is the
Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in National Institute of Family &
Life Advocates v. Becerra. 131 As described below, it cast substantial
doubt on the notion that professional speech should be treated
differently under the First Amendment. 132 Citing both the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling in Pickup and the Third Circuit’s decision in King,
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the Becerra majority that “[s]ome
Courts of Appeals have recognized ‘professional speech’ as a
separate category of speech that is subject to different rules.”133 He
noted that these courts exempt professional speech from the usual
principle that strict scrutiny applies to content-based laws. 134
Justice Thomas pushed back firmly against the emergence of a
special professional speech doctrine that is subject to its own unique
set of First Amendment principles.135 He stressed that the Court has
applied strict scrutiny when considering laws regulating the speech
of professionals in several contexts.136 The only two circumstances,
in fact, when professional speech merits review under a less stringent
test, Justice Thomas wrote, are when: (1) the government compels
127. King, 767 F.3d at 238.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 240.
130. See id. at 238; Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011);
Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1056 (9th Cir. 2013).
131. See NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372–73 (2018).
132. See id.
133. Id. at 2371 (citing Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1227–29; King, 767 F.3d at 232).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 2375 (“In sum, neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has
identified a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category
that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles. We do not foreclose the
possibility that some such reason exists.”).
136. See id. at 2374.
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“professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information”
when they advertise their services, and (2) the speech of
professionals is constrained only incidentally to the regulation of
their conduct, such as an informed-consent mandate being incidental
to a doctor performing a medical procedure. 137
The majority’s decision in Becerra casts serious doubt on the
existence of a separate professional speech doctrine that is immune
from strict scrutiny by calling out by name the cases of Pickup and
King, thereby questioning the use of those decisions as workarounds
from strict scrutiny in future anti-SOCE law litigation.138 Indeed, the
Otto majority cited Becerra in rejecting Boca Raton and Palm Beach
County’s argument that their statutes should not face strict
scrutiny. 139 In referencing Becerra, Judge Grant explained that “[t]he
local governments’ characterization of their ordinances as
professional regulations cannot lower that bar. The Supreme Court
has consistently rejected attempts to set aside the dangers of contentbased speech regulation in professional settings.” 140 In sum, framing
Otto as a professional speech case failed to lessen the burden
necessary to find that the ordinances passed First Amendment
muster. 141
Without citing Pickup by name, Judge Grant also rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in that case to treat SOCE as conduct rather
than speech.142 Once again citing Becerra to buttress her stance,
Judge Grant reasoned that “the Supreme Court also [has] rejected an
attempt to regulate speech by recharacterizing it as professional
conduct. . . . So too here. The local governments cannot rescue their
ordinances by calling the plaintiffs’ speech conduct.”143 In short, the
Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling in Becerra now provides ample
137. See id. at 2372.
138. See id. at 2371.
139. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 861 (11th Cir. 2020).
140. Id. The Otto majority added that:
because [Becerra] directly criticized Pickup and King—cases with very
close facts to this one—we do not think there is much question that, even
if some type of professional speech might conceivably fall outside the
First Amendment, the speech at issue here does not. But to whatever
extent [Becerra] failed to bind us with a direct holding on that point, we
now make that holding ourselves. These ordinances are content-based
regulations of speech and must satisfy strict scrutiny.
Id. at 867–68.
141. See id. at 861.
142. See supra notes 90–96 and accompanying text (addressing the Ninth
Circuit’s characterization of SOCE as conduct).
143. Otto, 981 F.3d at 861 (internal citation to Becerra omitted).
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ammunition for lower courts to rebuff the tactics deployed by the
Ninth and Third Circuits in Pickup and King, respectively, to evade
the application of strict scrutiny when evaluating First Amendment
challenges to anti-SOCE statutes. 144
With this overview of SOCE, laws targeting it, and the
appellate court rulings of Pickup and King in mind, this Article next
turns in greater detail to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown and,
specifically, the consideration therein of both social science evidence
and the opinions of learned professional organizations on the
question of harm caused by speech.
II. BROWN AND THE DIRECT CAUSAL LINK STANDARD: AN
IMPOSSIBLE LEVEL OF PROOF IN SOME INSTANCES?
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Supreme
Court, in the process of applying strict scrutiny, evaluated social
science evidence regarding harm purportedly caused by playing
violent video games in order to decide if California had a compelling
interest in restricting minors’ access to them. 145 Justice Scalia,
delivering the Court’s opinion and joined by four other Justices,
created a very high hurdle for California to overcome. 146 He did this
by: (1) stressing that California needed to prove the existence of “an

144. For example, in considering a First Amendment free-speech challenge
to an anti-SOCE statute adopted by the City of Tampa, Florida, U.S. Magistrate
Judge Amanda Sansone determined that Becerra had abrogated King’s holding that
intermediate scrutiny should apply when considering an anti-SOCE statute. See
Vazzo v. City of Tampa, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35935, *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30,
2019). Magistrate Sansone elaborated that Becerra “explicitly rejected King’s
holding that professional speech is subject to different standards of review under the
First Amendment than other speech. . . . [Becerra] instead held that the traditional
analyses that apply to content-based laws also apply to professional speech that is
neither commercial nor incidental to professional conduct.” Id. (internal citation to
Becerra omitted). In contrast to Magistrate Sansone’s conclusion in Vazzo, however,
U.S. District Judge Deborah Chasanow determined in Doyle v. Hogan, 411 F. Supp.
3d 337 (D. Md. 2019), that intermediate scrutiny—even after Becerra—supplied the
correct standard for reviewing a challenge to Maryland’s anti-SOCE statute. See
Doyle, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 346. Judge Sansone reasoned that SOCE, as regulated by
Maryland’s statute, “lands on the conduct end of the sliding scale” between speech
and conduct. Id. at 345.
145. See 564 U.S. 786, 799–800 (2011) (applying strict scrutiny and
considering social science evidence).
146. See id. at 787 (noting that Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined Justice Scalia’s opinion).

788

Michigan State Law Review

‘actual problem’ in need of solving,”147 (2) dubbing the need to prove
an actual problem “a demanding standard” for which “ambiguous
proof will not suffice,”148 and (3) requiring California to demonstrate
“a direct causal link between violent video games and harm to
minors,” not merely “some correlation” between the two. 149
The Brown majority found California’s evidence to be woefully
wanting under these strictures.150 Justice Scalia even dropped a
footnote to somewhat snarkily mock one study which concluded
“that children who had just finished playing violent video games
were more likely to fill in the blank letter in “explo_e” with a “d” (so
that it reads “explode”) than with an “r” (“explore”).”151 He wrote
that preventing “this phenomenon, which might have been
anticipated with common sense, is not a compelling state interest.” 152
One problem with Brown’s direct causal link requirement is, as
the author of this Article and Professor Matthew Bunker wrote
elsewhere, that it may be impossible in some scenarios even to
gather empirical proof of causal harm. 153 Justice Samuel Alito, in a
concurrence in Brown that agreed with the Court’s judgment and was
joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, pointed out this problem. 154
Justice Alito believed that the majority’s opinion likely would be
understood to require “supporting evidence that may not be
realistically obtainable given the nature of the phenomenon in
question.” 155 Justice Alito’s observation here “recognizes that there

147. Id. at 799 (quoting U.S. v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 822
(2000)).
148. Id. at 799, 800.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 800 (calling California’s evidence “not compelling” and
adding that all other courts that had considered it had also rejected it “with good
reason” because it failed to “prove that violent video games cause minors to act
aggressively (which would at least be a beginning)”).
151. Id. at 800 n.7.
152. Id.
153. See Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, An “Actual Problem” in First
Amendment Jurisprudence? Examining the Immediate Impact of Brown’s Proof-ofCausation Doctrine on Free Speech and Its Compatibility with the Marketplace
Theory, 35 HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 391, 428 (2013) (“Courts might . . .
ask whether the case at bar is one in which empirical causal data simply is difficult,
if not impossible, to gather or generate.”).
154. Brown, 564 U.S. at 814–15 (Alito, J., concurring).
155. Id.
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are limitations to social science research, such as the problem of
establishing a direct causal relationship.” 156
Justice Scalia, ironically in light of Brown, acknowledged this
situation in 2009 when considering whether indecent speech on the
broadcast airwaves harms minors in Federal Communications
Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 157 Justice Scalia
explained there that:
There are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be
marshaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on children is one
of them. One cannot demand a multiyear controlled study, in which some
children are intentionally exposed to indecent broadcasts (and insulated
from all other indecency), and others are shielded from all indecency. 158

This observation is important in the anti-SOCE law cases.
Why? Because, as noted earlier, Judge Martin in her Otto dissent
pointed out the ethical impossibility of conducting SOCE
experiments on minors to determine whether SOCE cause them
harm. 159 Such experiments are ethically impossible because children
might be hurt by taking part in them. 160 She explained the dangerous
predicament, if not utterly intolerable conundrum, in which the Otto
majority’s demand for unambiguous empirical proof of harm places
both minors and researchers: “[O]ne implication of the majority
holding is that because SOCE is too dangerous to study, children can
continue to be subjected to it. The majority opinion has the result of
inviting unethical research that is nowhere to be found in First
Amendment jurisprudence.” 161
Justice Stephen Breyer penned a dissenting opinion in
Brown. 162 As with the majority, he also examined the law under strict

156. Clay Calvert et al., Social Science, Media Effects & the Supreme Court:
Is Communication Research Relevant After Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association?, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 293, 309 (2012).
157. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009).
158. Id.
159. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 877 (11th Cir. 2020)
(Martin, J., dissenting) (“To be clear, the very research the majority opinion seems
to demand is ‘not ethically permissible’ to conduct.”).
160. See id. at 876 (Martin, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s preoccupation
with having additional research done ignores the harm such studies would have on
children. Evaluating the impact of SOCE under controlled conditions would require
exposing minors to SOCE.”).
161. Id. at 877.
162. Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 840–57 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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scrutiny. 163 Justice Breyer thus reasoned that California was required
to demonstrate a compelling interest.164 Yet, in contrast to the
majority, Justice Breyer would have upheld the statute under that
exacting test.165
More significantly, at least for purposes of this Article and as
described below, Justice Breyer’s dissent offers an alternative to
Justice Scalia and the majority’s approach for evaluating evidence of
speech-attributed harm. 166 Specifically, Justice Breyer was willing to
defer to the judgments and opinions of learned professional
organizations in interpreting the social science evidence that
California lawmakers had relied on when enacting the video game
statute. 167 Justice Breyer pointed out that some studies had, in fact,
found that playing violent video games causes aggression. 168 He
readily acknowledged, however, that other studies indicated the
opposite and that all of the studies had their share of critics.169 Given
what thus might be considered a mixed bag of social science
evidence, Justice Breyer’s solution was to respectfully step back and
to grant deference to the multiple esteemed professional associations
that had already interpreted the data, rather than impose his own
nonscientific judgment on the collective body of evidence.170 He
explained that:
163. See id. at 841 (“In determining whether the statute is unconstitutional, I
would apply both this Court’s ‘vagueness’ precedents and a strict form of First
Amendment scrutiny.”) (emphasis added).
164. See id. at 847 (“Like the majority, I believe that the California law must
be ‘narrowly tailored’ to further a ‘compelling interest,’ without there being a ‘less
restrictive’ alternative that would be ‘at least as effective.’”) (citing Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 874–75, 879 (1997)) (emphasis added).
165. See id. at 857 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that “California’s law
is constitutional on its face”).
166. See id. at 791 (discussing the precedent that the Court follows in its
harmful speech analysis).
167. See id. at 853, 855.
168. See id. at 851 (“Longitudinal studies, which measure changes over time,
have found that increased exposure to violent video games causes an increase in
aggression over the same period.”).
169. See id. at 853 (“Experts debate the conclusions of all these studies. Like
many, perhaps most, studies of human behavior, each study has its critics, and some
of those critics have produced studies of their own in which they reach different
conclusions.”).
170. See id. at 855. These organizations included the American Academy of
Pediatrics, the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, the American
Psychological Association, the American Medical Association, the American
Academy of Family Physicians, and the American Psychiatric Association, all of
which in 2000 issued a joint statement regarding the social science evidence related
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I, like most judges, lack the social science expertise to say definitively
who is right. But associations of public health professionals who do
possess that expertise have reviewed many of these studies and found a
significant risk that violent video games, when compared with more
passive media, are particularly likely to cause children harm. 171

Justice Breyer thus rather humbly accepted the opinions and
judgments of professional associations, which he deemed better
qualified than his own to make sense of the data. Justice Breyer also
was willing to tolerate more ambiguity, as he noted that some
evidence supporting California was “controverted.”172 Additionally,
he did not demand a direct causal link between the speech in
question and the harm to which it allegedly gives rise.173 Instead, the
judgment of professional associations that the speech created “a
significant risk” of harm was sufficient.174 Furthermore, the fact that
all of the evidence failed to support California’s statute did not doom
it to an unconstitutional fate; what mattered, instead, for Justice
Breyer was that there was “considerable evidence” and “substantial
(though controverted) evidence” to support it. 175 All of this flexibility
contrasts with the Brown majority’s stance that under strict scrutiny,
“uncertainty” of evidence and “ambiguous proof will not suffice.” 176
Justice Breyer then added a second layer of deference to his
approach—one he pointed out that the majority had failed to
provide. 177 Namely, Justice Breyer deferred to the judgment of
California lawmakers in relying on the opinions of these professional
associations, rather than injecting the judiciary into an obstructive
position in between lawmakers and the associations.178 Justice Breyer
found:
sufficient grounds in these studies and expert opinions for this Court to
defer to an elected legislature’s conclusion that the video games in
question are particularly likely to harm children. This Court has always
thought it owed an elected legislature some degree of deference in respect
to using violent interactive entertainment products, such as video games, and the
negative outcomes of doing so. See id. at 853. Justice Breyer also cited subsequent
statements issued by professional associations. See id.
171. Id. at 853.
172. See id. at 858.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 853.
175. See id. at 850, 858.
176. See id. at 800 (majority opinion).
177. See id. at 855 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority, in reaching its
own, opposite conclusion about the validity of the relevant studies, grants the
legislature no deference at all.”).
178. See id.
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to legislative facts of this kind, particularly when they involve technical
matters that are beyond our competence, and even in First Amendment
cases. 179

In summary, Justice Breyer’s approach for assessing harm
allegedly caused by speech involved a combination of:
(1) citing and examining specific scientific studies, including
“many . . . that support California’s views;”180
(2) tolerating the fact that not all of the evidence tilted in
California’s favor and that numerous studies, in fact, did not
help the state’s position; 181
(3) relying on the judgments of multiple professional
associations in terms of their interpretations of the scientific
studies; 182 and
(4) deferring to the lawmakers’ decision to rely on the
judgments and “expert opinions” of those same professional
associations.183 This holistic, deferential methodology
ultimately led Justice Breyer to conclude that, under strict
scrutiny, California had demonstrated “a compelling
interest” in “supplementing parents’ efforts to prevent their
children from purchasing potentially harmful violent,
interactive material.”184
Justice Breyer’s approach to scientific evidence in Brown thus
illustrates that “he can tolerate ambiguity and, in turn, weigh the pros
and cons of conflicting research results before coming down on one
side, especially when multiple professional organizations possessing
expertise within a field are unified in their view.” 185 This tack offers
ample support for and, in fact, closely approximates the one that
179. Id.
180. Id. at 851.
181. Justice Breyer, in fact, created two lengthy appendices that catalogued
“peer-reviewed academic journal articles on the topic of psychological harm
resulting from playing violent video games,” devoting one to articles “supporting the
hypothesis that violent video games are harmful” and the other two articles “not
supporting/rejecting the hypothesis that violent video games are harmful.” See id. at
858. He listed more than two dozen articles in the latter category that either did not
support or rejected California’s position that violent video games are harmful. See
also id. at 869–72.
182. See id. at 853–54.
183. See id. at 855.
184. See id. at 856.
185. See Calvert et al., supra note 156, at 308.
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Judge Martin later embraced in her Otto dissent supporting the antiSOCE statutes adopted by Boca Raton and Palm Beach County. 186
In particular, Judge Martin openly recognized that the 2009
APA task force report—the same document the Otto majority relied
on to reach its conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of
harm caused by SOCE—had lamented the absence of recent rigorous
research on the impact of SOCE. 187 Yet, she pointed out that the task
force report, as well as statements issued by other organizations, also
indicated that there are risks of harm caused by SOCE. 188 In other
words, she was willing, as was Justice Breyer in Brown, to tolerate
some ambiguity in the evidence.189 The Otto majority, in contrast,
required the evidence to be certain that SOCE cause harm in order
for the ordinances to satisfy strict scrutiny’s demands. 190
Additionally, Justice Breyer and Judge Martin adopted similar
thresholds for the requisite level of supporting evidence necessary to
uphold the statutes under strict scrutiny. 191 Justice Breyer, as noted
earlier, used the terms “considerable” and “substantial” when
describing the evidence California had mustered in support of its
statute. 192 Similarly, Judge Martin invoked the term “strong
evidence” in her Otto dissent when encapsulating the evidence
marshaled by Boca Raton and Palm Beach County.193
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, Judge Martin, as
with Justice Breyer in Brown, gave weight and importance to the
opinions and views of professional associations regarding the
scientific evidence.194 Judge Martin reasoned that “[w]hen it comes
to regulation of allegedly harmful medical practices, the judgment of

186. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 876 (11th Cir. 2020)
(Martin, J., dissenting).
187. See id.; see also id. at 869 (“We focus our attention on the APA’s 2009
task force report.”).
188. See id. at 876.
189. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 858 (noting Justice Breyer’s tolerance of some
studies that contradicted California’s position that playing violent video games
caused harm).
190. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 869 n.9 (“Permitting uncertain evidence to satisfy
strict scrutiny would blur the lines that separate it from lesser tiers of scrutiny—that
is, intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review.”).
191. See id. at 872; Brown, 564 U.S. at 850, 858 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 850, 858 (using the terms considerable and
substantial to describe the evidence used to survive strict scrutiny).
193. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 872 (Martin, J., dissenting).
194. See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text (addressing Justice
Breyer’s deference to the views of professional associations).
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professional organizations strikes me as quite relevant.” 195
Government officials, in turn, should be allowed to rely on those
judgments, along with the results of scientific studies, without courts
demanding additional new studies that are impossible to conduct
because of ethical concerns about deliberately exposing minors to
SOCE. 196 As Judge Martin crisply summed it up, “[t]he scientific and
medical communities have done their jobs, the state has done its job,
and now it is for us to do our job in the simple application of the
law.” 197 For the judiciary to require more evidence at this stage
would be akin to moving the First Amendment goalposts further
downfield and out of reach of Boca Raton and Palm Beach
County. 198
In summary, the Brown majority’s approach to scientific
evidence creates an extremely high bar for proving compelling
interests in First Amendment speech cases.199 The Otto majority’s
reliance on a Brown-like evidentiary methodology proved crucial to
its decision holding unconstitutional the local anti-SOCE statutes at
issue in that case. 200 For the Otto majority, scientific evidence must
be unequivocal to satisfy strict scrutiny. 201 The opinions and
viewpoints of professional organizations simply are no substitute for
such certain, unambiguous evidence.202 This Part also illustrated that:
(1) Justice Breyer’s dissent in Brown offers a very different and more
deferential, holistic strategy for evaluating scientific evidence in free
speech cases; 203 and (2) Judge Martin’s dissent in Otto—although not
citing Justice Breyer’s Brown dissent—tracked it in several ways and
led her to reach a very different conclusion, when compared with the
Otto majority, regarding the evidence supporting Boca Raton and
195. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 878 (Martin, J., dissenting).
196. See id. at 876 (“The majority’s preoccupation with having additional
research done ignores the harm such studies would have on children.”).
197. See id. at 879.
198. Cf. id. at 879 (referring to the majority’s approach as “nothing short of a
moving target approach to the First Amendment”).
199. See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text (addressing the ways
in which Brown creates a high evidentiary standard).
200. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (addressing the Otto
majority’s interpretation of Brown and its reliance on it).
201. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 869 (“We fail to see how . . . such equivocal
conclusions can satisfy strict scrutiny and overcome the strong presumption against
content-based limitations on speech.”).
202. See id. (“Strict scrutiny cannot be satisfied by professional societies’
opposition to speech.”).
203. See supra notes 166–84 and accompanying text (addressing Justice
Breyer’s approach to social science evidence in Brown).
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Palm Beach County’s anti-SOCE ordinances.204 The next Part places
these observations within a more critical, macro-level context—
namely, divisions among the U.S. Supreme Court’s Justices in hotbutton First Amendment free-speech cases and “the larger
jurisprudential backdrop that is the current debate over the
deregulatory use of the First Amendment in pursuit of a laissez faire,
Lochner-style market.” 205
III. ANOTHER STEP TOWARD WEAPONIZING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT? A CRITICAL AND CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE
OTTO MAJORITY’S EVIDENTIARY APPROACH
As this Article suggested earlier, the three Eleventh Circuit
judges in Otto split neatly along perceived political lines: The two
appointees of former President Trump—Judges Grant and Lagoa—
formed the majority and struck down the anti-SOCE ordinances,
while the appointee of former President Obama—Judge Martin—
dissented and declared the measures constitutional.206 More bluntly
and perhaps provocatively, the Trump appointees ruled in favor of
permitting the widely condemned practice of SOCE on minors, while
the lone Obama appointee delivered an opinion against the
controversial practice. 207
This Part takes a more critical, opinionated approach than the
prior Parts of this Article. It explains that this rift among the Otto
judges mirrors the ideological cleft among the Justices on the U.S.
Supreme Court in two recent First Amendment cases that involve
similar, politically-charged topics—abortion and labor unions.208
Furthermore, this Part asserts that the Otto majority’s use of an
extremely demanding, Brown-like test when evaluating the scientific
evidence of harm purportedly caused by SOCE falls very much in
line with the deployment of heightened scrutiny by the Supreme
204. See supra notes 189–98 and accompanying text (comparing Judge
Martin’s approach to evidence in Otto with that of Justice Breyer’s methodology in
Brown).
205. Claudia E. Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 VAND. L. REV. 501, 504
(2019); see also infra notes 257–67 and accompanying text (addressing Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and the concept of First Amendment Lochnerism).
206. See infra notes 279–294 and accompanying text (identifying who
appointed the three judges in Otto to the Eleventh Circuit).
207. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 872 (Martin, J., dissenting).
208. See infra notes 217–232 and accompanying text (addressing the
political ideology split between the majority and minority justices in an abortion and
labor union Supreme Court case).
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Court’s conservative Justices.209 That approach facilitates the First
Amendment’s use as a robust deregulatory tool for targeting and
eradicating economic and social welfare legislation.210 In contrast,
Judge Martin’s more flexible approach in Otto for considering the
scientific evidence of injury allegedly caused by SOCE does more
than just track Justice Breyer’s approach to evidence in Brown, as
noted earlier.211 Judge Martin’s methodology also evinces a more
deferential stance when it comes to reviewing legislative
handiwork—a stance that is in accord with the Supreme Court’s
liberal Justices’ call for the use of less rigorous standards of scrutiny
in the contentious First Amendment cases involving abortion and
labor unions addressed below. 212
In sum, this Part situates the Eleventh Circuit’s fractured ruling
in Otto, including its contrasting views on the evaluation of scientific
evidence, squarely within the confines of other hot-button, First
Amendment free-speech battles at the nation’s highest court.213
Adopting Brown’s stringent standard for evaluating scientific
evidence under strict scrutiny in cases such as Otto thus can be
viewed as adding another First Amendment arrow to the quiver of
conservative jurists seeking to undo legislation that might be
perceived in certain quarters as left-leaning.
As noted above, the Justices of the Supreme Court recently
splintered along the lines of perceived political ideologies in First
Amendment free speech cases affecting abortion and labor unions.214
209. See infra notes 223, 235, 239, 214–18 (addressing the heightened
scrutiny of evidence applied by Supreme Court conservative justices in recent
cases).
210. See infra notes 247–248 (addressing the conservative Justices’
heightened scrutiny test implemented as a deregulation tool).
211. See supra notes 189–98 and accompanying text (comparing Judge
Martin’s approach to evidence in Otto with that of Justice Breyer’s methodology in
Brown).
212. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 874 (Martin J., dissenting).
213. See supra notes 1–22, 38–44 and accompanying text (comparing the
minority versus the majority holding in Otto).
214. In addition to the cases discussed immediately below involving abortion
and labor unions, the Court divided five-to-four along the same ideological lines in
Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019). See Clay
Calvert, Dissent, Disagreement and Doctrinal Disarray: Free Expression and the
Roberts Court in 2020, 28 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 865, 867 (2020) (noting that
in Halleck, “[a]ll five Justices in the majority—John Roberts, Clarence Thomas,
Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh—were nominated by Republican
presidents and are typically considered conservative,” while “all four Justices in the
dissent—Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena
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First, consider the Court’s 2018 five-to-four ruling in National
Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra. 215 This case was
mentioned earlier in relation to the level of First Amendment
protection extended for professional speech.216 Becerra witnessed the
Justices fracturing “along familiar ideological lines.” 217 Specifically,
it featured a five-Justice conservative majority and a four-Justice
liberal dissent.218 The majority declared likely unconstitutional two
parts of a California law that compelled anti-abortion crisis
pregnancy centers (CPCs) to convey certain truthful, factual
information against their will.219
Kagan—were nominated by Democratic presidents and are generally deemed
liberal”).
The conservative majority in Halleck rejected a First Amendment
challenge to the decision made by a private nonprofit corporation to deny two film
producers access to a public access cable television channel in New York City based
on the content of one of their films. 139 S. Ct. at 1926–27. (noting that film
producers DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez claimed that Manhattan
Neighborhood Network (“MNN”) “violated their First Amendment free-speech
rights when MNN restricted their access to the public access channels because of the
content of their film”). Writing for the majority, Justice Brett Kavanaugh reasoned
that “[i]n operating the public access channels, MNN is a private actor, not a state
actor, and MNN therefore is not subject to First Amendment constraints on its
editorial discretion.” Id. at 1926. In contrast, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote for the
four-Justice liberal dissent that MNN qualified as a state actor under its agency
relationship with New York City to operate the public access channels and thus
MNN was bound by the First Amendment’s strictures. See id. at 1934 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
Given this rift, as well as those in the cases of National Institute of
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018), and Janus v. American
Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018),
discussed later in this Part, the author of this Article asserted elsewhere that “[a]s the
Court enters the 2020s, First Amendment jurisprudence is profoundly plagued by,
among other problems, ideological partisanship in cases such as Halleck.” Calvert,
supra note 214, at 915.
215. See generally 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
216. See supra notes 131–144 and accompanying text (addressing Becerra’s
discussion of professional speech).
217. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional
Gerrymandering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
61, 63 (2019).
218. See NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2367, 2379 (noting that the opinion
of the Court was authored by Justice Clarence Thomas and was joined by Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Samuel Alito and Neil
Gorsuch, and noting that Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion that
was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan).
219. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378 (“We hold that petitioners are likely to
succeed on the merits of their claim that the FACT Act violates the First
Amendment.”); see also Teneille R. Brown, Crisis at the Pregnancy Center:
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Licensed CPCs, for instance, were mandated to disclose the
fact to patients that California offers free and low-cost abortion
services. 220 That disclosure arguably dilutes the power of the CPCs’
own anti-abortion position. 221 In other words, as I argued elsewhere,
“a licensed crisis pregnancy center with an anti-abortion stance
might find that its message’s influence is mitigated (or at least
contaminated) by transmitting a fact suggesting that one’s financial
status imposes no barrier to obtaining an abortion.”222 In striking
down that compelled-speech obligation, the Becerra majority applied
intermediate scrutiny rather than the more forgiving rational basis
standard. 223
In contrast, Justice Stephen Breyer penned a dissent on behalf
of the Court’s liberal wing, concluding the obligations imposed on
CPCs were “likely constitutional.”224 In doing so, Justice Breyer
criticized the majority for applying what he called “heightened

Regulating Pseudo-Clinics and Reclaiming Informed Consent, 30 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 221, 224–25 (2018) (asserting that the purpose of CPCs “is primarily to
counsel against abortion,” and adding that their counseling “is exclusively pro-life
and ‘Bible-based’”); Mark Strasser, Deception, Professional Speech, and CPCs: On
Becerra, Abortion, and the First Amendment, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 311, 313–14 (2019)
(noting that CPCs “do not provide abortions, and may seek to dissuade women from
aborting their pregnancies,” and adding that “[c]ritics charge that some of the centers
use deceptive means to reduce the number of abortions performed, for example, by
misrepresenting in advertisements what the centers do so that women seeking
abortions will nonetheless come to the clinics”) (emphasis in original) (internal
citations omitted).
220. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2368 (“Licensed clinics must notify women
that California provides free or low-cost services, including abortions, and give them
a phone number to call.”).
221. Justice Clarence Thomas explained for the majority that:
licensed clinics must provide a government-drafted script about the
availability of state-sponsored services, as well as contact information for
how to obtain them. One of those services is abortion—the very practice
that [the clinics] are devoted to opposing. By requiring [the clinics] to
inform women how they can obtain state-subsidized abortions—at the
same time [the clinics] try to dissuade women from choosing that option—
the licensed notice plainly ‘alters the content’ of [the clinics’] speech.
Id. at 2371.
222. Clay Calvert, Wither Zauderer, Blossom Heightened Scrutiny? How the
Supreme Court’s 2018 Rulings in Becerra and Janus Exacerbate Problems with
Compelled-Speech Jurisprudence, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1408–09 (2019).
223. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375 (concluding that “the licensed notice
cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny”); see also supra notes 97–98 and
accompanying text (addressing the rational basis test and when it typically applies).
224. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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scrutiny.” 225 He also derided the majority for “suggesting that
heightened scrutiny applies to much economic and social
legislation.” 226 Justice Breyer asserted there was “no reason” to apply
heightened scrutiny to laws such as California’s that simply require
medical professionals to disclose purely factual information to
patients. 227 Instead, the dissent contended that the Court should adopt
a more “respectful approach to economic and social legislation” that
implicates the First Amendment freedom of speech in cases like
Becerra. 228 As Professor William Araiza sums it up, the Becerra
dissent voiced discomfort regarding “the Court’s use of the First
Amendment as a weapon against the type of business regulation long
presumed constitutional.”229
The fact that abortion was the underlying issue in Becerra
likely drove the wedge between the majority and minority. To wit,
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky and Professor Michele Goodwin assert
that the majority’s decision to strike down California’s compelledspeech obligations on CPCs simply reflects “the conservative
Justices’ views on abortion rights.” 230 The pair’s understanding of the
decision explains why, in turn, the First Amendment rights of antiabortion CPCs triumphed over the rights of patients at those centers
to receive truthful, factual information about abortion services. 231
The Justices also fractured five-to-four, in what has been called
a “party-line vote,” in 2018 in Janus v. American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees. 232 The conservative majority,
in an anti-union opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, declared
that an Illinois statute compelling non-union, public-sector
employees to pay an agency fee—also known as a fair-share fee—to
the union designated to represent them in collective bargaining with
the State of Illinois violated those non-union members’ First

225. See id. at 2380.
226. See id. at 2382.
227. See id. at 2387.
228. See id. at 2382.
229. See William D. Araiza, Invasion of the Content-Neutrality Rule, 2019
BYU L. REV. 875, 892–93 (2019).
230. See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 217, at 124.
231. See Helen Norton, Pregnancy and the First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2417, 2428 (2019) (“The [Becerra] majority’s opinion centered only on the
speakers and what they did and did not want to say, entirely ignoring pregnant
women’s First Amendment interests as listeners.”).
232. See 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); see also Aaron Tang, Life After Janus, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 677, 693 (2019) (calling it a “party-line vote”).
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Amendment right of free speech.233 In other words, under the First
Amendment, non-union members could not be compelled to
subsidize, via agency fees, the speech of private entities (the unions)
during collective bargaining on their behalf with the government.234
In striking down the Illinois statute, the conservative majority
refused to apply the deferential rational basis standard of review that
the liberal dissent deemed applicable.235 Justice Alito somewhat
curtly derided rational basis review as a “form of minimal scrutiny
[that] is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence.”236 The majority,
instead, applied a heightened standard of review that it called
“exacting scrutiny” and concluded the statute failed to surmount it.237
In the process of doing so, the majority overruled a forty-year-old
precedent that had upheld agency fees. 238 The majority
acknowledged the deleterious financial impact that its decision
eliminating agency fees for non-union, public-sector employees
might have on labor unions. 239
Authoring a dissent on behalf of the Court’s liberal bloc,
Justice Elena Kagan criticized the majority for not adopting the
Court’s “usual deferential approach . . . to the regulation of public
employee speech.” 240 She lauded that usual approach for giving
“wide berth” to the government’s decisions when it acts as an
233. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460 (“We conclude that this arrangement
violates the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize
private speech on matters of substantial public concern.”). An agency fee represents
a percentage of regular union dues that is designated exclusively to cover costs
associated with collective bargaining and cannot be used “to fund the union’s
political and ideological projects.” See id. at 2460–61; see also Alan M. Klinger &
Dina Kolker, Public Sector Unions Can Survive Janus, 34 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
267, 268 n.4 (2020) (“Fair share fees, also called agency fees, are fees charged to
employees who are represented by a union but who opt not to join the union. They
represent the employee’s ‘fair share’ of the cost of collective bargaining and services
which the employee enjoys as a part of the bargaining unit.”).
234. As Justice Alito explained, “the compelled subsidization of private
speech seriously impinges on First Amendment rights.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.
235. See id. at 2465.
236. See id.
237. See id; see also Tang, supra note 232, at 693 (noting that the Janus
majority “proceeded to apply heightened scrutiny to the fair-share fee requirement”).
238. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460 (overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
239. See id. at 2485–86 (“We recognize that the loss of payments from
nonmembers may cause unions to experience unpleasant transition costs in the short
term, and may require unions to make adjustments in order to attract and retain
members.”).
240. See id. at 2494 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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employer. 241 Justice Kagan blasted the majority for “turning the First
Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic
and regulatory policy.” 242 In brief, by adopting heightened scrutiny
and not affording Illinois lawmakers deference, the majority was, in
Justice Kagan’s unsparing words, “weaponizing the First
Amendment.” 243 In closing her dissent, she also cited Becerra as
another opinion in which the conservative majority had “wielded the
First Amendment in such an aggressive way.” 244
Janus, as Professor Kate Andrais writes, marked “the capstone
of the anti-union campaign” by both conservative Republicans and
the Supreme Court’s conservative Justices.245 After Janus, it was
anticipated that labor unions would be financially hamstrung, all to
the benefit of private corporations. 246
Viewed collectively, Becerra and Janus not only illustrate an
ideological cleft on the Court when it comes to the First Amendment
freedom of speech, but they also reveal the conservative majority’s
expansive view of the protections afforded by that amendment
against government regulations.247 In academic circles, the
conservative majority’s use of heightened First Amendment scrutiny
to strike down economic and social regulations such as those at issue
in Becerra and Janus sometimes is called First Amendment
Lochnerism. 248 As Professor Enrique Armijo tidily explicates it, First
241. See id. at 2493.
242. See id. at 2501.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See Kate Andrias, Janus’s Two Faces, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 21, 27.
246. See Andrew Storm, Caught in a Vicious Cycle: A Weak Labor
Movement Emboldens the Ruling Class, 16 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 19, 37 (2019) (“The
expectation was that weakened unions would have less money to spend on politics,
further entrenching the power of the corporate interests.”).
247. See Laura Portuondo, Abortion Regulation as Compelled Speech, 67
UCLA L. REV. 2, 4 (2020) (asserting that Becerra and Janus, along with
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018),
“demonstrated the Court’s increasing embrace of broad First Amendment
protections,” and adding that Becerra “followed a recent trend of expanding First
Amendment protections”).
248. This term is a reference to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court there declared that a state labor
law limiting the number of hours to sixty a week that bakers could work violated an
individual’s liberty and freedom of contract, thus taking priority over the state’s
exercise of its police power in the interest of health and safety. See id. at 57 (“There
is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free
contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.”). The socalled “Lochner era is conventionally (and sometimes nostalgically) associated with
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Amendment Lochnerism is “the claim that the Court’s conservative
majority, at the urging of commercial and other powerful interests
and following its own antiregulatory agenda, has turned the
constitutional protection for free speech into a tool with which to
blow holes in the regulatory state.” 249
Under this critique, Professor Genevieve Lakier writes, the
First Amendment, much like the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in
Lochner v. New York did when it came to empowering the liberty of
contract, “grants judges too much power to second-guess the
economic policy decisions of democratically elected legislatures.”250
First Amendment Lochnerism thus, as Professor Nelson Nebbe
contends, is a “trope [that] compares the Supreme Court’s
contemporary speech and religion jurisprudence to its decisionmaking during the Lochner era.” 251 In deploying it, judges construe
the “freedoms of speech and religion in a manner that unwinds
government programs designed to ameliorate disparities of wealth,
income, and other primary goods.” 252 In brief, Professor Erica
Goldberg observes that “accusations by the political left about the
political right, which detail the ‘Lochnerization’ or weaponization of
the First Amendment to benefit specific classes of people or political
interests, are increasingly part of the mainstream discourse
surrounding current free speech doctrine.”253
Indeed, Justice Breyer cited both the Lochner case and the
Lochner era in criticizing the majority’s application of heightened
scrutiny in Becerra. 254 Some legal scholars, in turn, contend that
notions of limited government and laissez-faire, often neatly wrapped up in the
supposition that the law of the Lochner era is a bygone.” Mila Sohoni, The Trump
Administration and the Law of the Lochner Era, 107 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1331 (2019).
From the late 1880s to the late 1930s, “[t]he period’s best-known cases are those in
which the Court struck down economic laws that restricted the employer-employee
relationship, the freedom to contract, the freedom to manufacture, and the freedom
to sell goods and services.” Id.
249. See Enrique Armijo, Faint-Hearted First Amendment Lochnerism, 100
B.U. L. REV. 1377, 1380 (2020).
250. See Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem,
87 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 1241, 1243 (2020). See supra note 248 (discussing
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
251. See Nelson Tebbe, A Democratic Political Economy for the First
Amendment, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 960 (2020).
252. See id. at 959.
253. See Erica Goldberg, First Amendment Cynicism and Redemption, 88 U.
CIN. L. REV. 959, 967 (2020).
254. See NIFLA. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381–82 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).

Calvert

Weaponizing Proof of Harm

803

Becerra “raised alarm about the Roberts Court’s use of the First
Amendment as a weapon, and even a new First Amendment
Lochnerism.” 255 The same critique holds true for the majority’s
decision in Janus, with Professor Mila Sohoni remarking that Justice
Kagan’s dissent sub silentio accused the majority of engaging in
First Amendment Lochnerism. 256 Others have also noted the
similarity between Janus and Lochner. 257 For Justices Breyer and
Kagan in Becerra and Janus, respectively, the First Amendment free
speech expansionism evidenced by the majority opinions in those
cases is seen as “serving conservative ends.” 258
It is within this ideologically polarized First Amendment
climate that the Eleventh Circuit’s fractured decision in Otto
regarding legislation intended to protect minors from ostensible
harms caused by SOCE should be viewed.259 Both the Trumpappointed judges in the majority and the Obama-appointed
dissenting judge applied the same strict scrutiny test when
considering the constitutionality of the local anti-SOCE ordinances
at issue in the case. 260 The case thus differs from Becerra and Janus
because the key point of contention among the Eleventh Circuit
255. See First Amendment-Physician Compelled Speech-Sixth Circuit
Upholds Kentucky Law Requiring Doctors Performing Abortions to First Conduct
an Ultrasound and Describe the Image-EMW Women’s Surgical Center., P.S.C. v.
Beshear, 920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019), reh’g en banc denied, Nos. 17-6151/6183,
2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 19623 (6th Cir. June 28, 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 655
(2019), 133 HARV. L. REV. 2204, 2211 (2020).
256. See Sohoni, supra note 248, at 1383 (“Though she did not use this
locution, Justice Kagan’s dissent argued in essence that the Court was being
Lochnerist in its end-results (by constitutionally invalidating ‘workaday’ economic
policy), if not in its means (because it used the First Amendment rather than
substantive due process).”).
257. See, e.g., Jareb A. Gleckel & Sherry F. Colb, The Meaning of Meat, 26
ANIMAL L. 75, 102 (2020) (“Janus . . . followed in the footsteps of Lochner. . . . Not
unlike the liberty protected in Janus, Lochner championed freedom for the
individual laborer to agree to work more than 60-hours-a-week in a bakery, a
freedom that humane labor laws had unconstitutionally threatened.”).
258. See Marc O. Degirolami, The Sickness unto Death of the First
Amendment, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 751, 799 (2019).
259. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 859 (11th Cir. 2020)
(“The City and the County both passed ordinances based on legislative findings that
SOCE poses a serious health risk to minors. These findings cited various studies and
the position papers of numerous medical and public health organizations.”).
260. See id. at 867–68 (noting the majority’s position that the “ordinances
are content-based regulations of speech and must satisfy strict scrutiny.”); id. at 873
(Martin, J., dissenting) (noting the dissent’s “assumption that the Ordinances are
content-based speech restrictions” and her conclusion that they “satisfy strict
scrutiny”).
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judges in Otto did not center on whether a heightened level of First
Amendment scrutiny should apply. 261 They all agreed that strict
scrutiny, “a demanding standard . . . [that] the government usually
has trouble satisfying,” was applicable.262 It is, in fact, the highest
level of review of in First Amendment speech cases.263 Only in rare
cases is it surmounted. 264
The rift in Otto, instead, was over how the judges applied strict
scrutiny. 265 More specifically, it centered on how the majority and
dissent differed when assessing and interpreting the scientific
evidence offered by Boca Raton and Palm Beach County to prove
that SOCE are sufficiently harmful to minors as to constitute the type
of compelling interest in censoring speech that strict scrutiny
requires. 266 By following a strenuous evidentiary approach very
similar to that articulated by Justice Antonin Scalia in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the conservative majority in Otto
found a way to make strict scrutiny so strict that it doomed the
efforts of two governmental entities to protect the health and safety
of gay minors. 267 Brown’s requirement of proof of “a direct causal
link” between speech and harm—one for which “ambiguous proof
will not suffice”—thus can be weaponized by conservative jurists, as
Justice Kagan might put it, against health and safety legislation.268
Brown, in brief, becomes a weapon within the already demanding
strict scrutiny test. In contrast, the more deferential and flexible
261. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
262. See Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise
of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 243 (2016).
263. See Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact?
First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMMC’N. L. &
POL’Y 349, 350 (2011) (describing strict scrutiny as “the most searching form of
judicial review in free speech cases”).
264. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (“This is . . .
one of the rare cases in which a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny.”)
(emphasis added).
265. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 868–69 (11th Cir. 2020);
id. at 878 (Martin, J., dissenting).
266. See supra notes 15–33, 40–44, and 186–198 and accompanying text
(addressing the different approaches deployed to evaluate the evidence by the
majority and dissent in Otto).
267. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 859, 868.
268. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799–800 (2011). See
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for “weaponizing the First
Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in
economic and regulatory policy”).
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evidentiary approach of the liberal-leaning Justice Breyer in
Brown—one that Obama-appointee Judge Martin in Otto seemingly
embraced, even without explicitly citing Breyer’s stance—blunts that
weapon. 269
Drilling deeper into the underlying political context and
connecting the judicial dots, the ideological link between Judge
Grant and Justice Scalia—the authors of the majority opinions in
Otto and Brown, respectively—that runs through the Federalist
Society is apparent.270 The organization’s members believe “that
individual citizens can make the best choices for themselves and
society.” 271 The group also subscribes to “the need to enhance
individual freedom and the role of the courts in saying what the law
is rather than what they wish it to be.”272 Judge Grant was a former
president of the Federalist Society at Stanford Law School. 273 In
Otto, she used a standard created in Brown by Justice Scalia, who
“helped organize the University of Chicago Law School chapter of
the Federalist Society” while serving as a professor there.274 Judge
Grant deployed that Scalia-fashioned standard to facilitate a variation
of First Amendment Lochnerism in deregulating constraints imposed
on the use of SOCE.275 The Federalist Society, as the New York
269. See supra notes 166–84 and accompanying text (addressing Justice
Breyer’s approach to the evidence proffered in Brown); see supra notes 187–98 and
accompanying text (addressing Judge Martin’s approach to the evidence proffered in
Otto).
270. The Federalist Society, formally known as the Federalist Society for
Law and Public Policy Studies, describes itself as:
[A] group of conservatives and libertarians interested in the current state
of the legal order. It is founded on the principles that the state exists to
preserve freedom, that the separation of governmental powers is central to
our Constitution, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be.
SOC’Y,
https://fedsoc.org/about-us#FAQ
About
Us,
FEDERALIST
[https://perma.cc/9PKB-V3ZL] (last visited Oct. 11, 2021). It believes that “[l]aw
schools and the legal profession are currently strongly dominated by a form of
orthodox liberal ideology which advocates a centralized and uniform society.” Id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
SOC’Y,
273. See
Hon.
Britt
C.
Grant,
FEDERALIST
https://fedsoc.org/contributors/britt-grant [https://perma.cc/BR93-DKXC]
(last
visited Oct. 11, 2021).
OF
CHI.
L.
SCH.,
274. See
Federalist
Society,
UNIV.
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/studentorgs/federalist [https://perma.cc/237B-UD4C]
(last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
275. See supra notes 248–253 and accompanying text (addressing First
Amendment Lochnerism).
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Times noted in a May 2020 article, “has been ascendant in
Republican circles for its advocacy of strictly interpreting the
Constitution according to what conservatives say was its original
meaning.” 276 The organization, the article alleged, “has been
instrumental in promoting Mr. Trump’s judicial picks, many of
whom spent their careers openly engaged in causes that have been
important to Republicans, such as opposition to gay marriage and to
government funding for abortion.” 277 In Judge Grant’s response to
the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee’s questionnaire for judicial
nominees upon her nomination to the Eleventh Circuit, she noted her
affiliation with “[t]he Federalist Society for Law and Policy” as
running from 2004 to the present. 278 Thus, when skeptically viewed,
Judge Grant in Otto simply took the Brown baton from Justice Scalia
and used it, in the spirit of First Amendment Lochnerism, against
two local governmental efforts to protect the mental health of young
members of the LGBTQ community.
Just as Becerra and Janus were as much battles about abortion
and labor unions as they were about First Amendment speech rights,
Otto was just as much about a skirmish over growing cultural and
legislative acceptance of homosexuality as it was free expression.
The First Amendment—in particular, Brown’s evidentiary standard
under strict scrutiny for proving speech-caused harm—simply
became the doctrinal instrument for pushing back against anti-SOCE
laws that accept homosexuality as normal. Judge Grant seemingly
tipped her hand when she wrote that “we cannot allow a new
consensus to justify restrictions on speech. Professional opinions and
cultural attitudes may have changed, but the First Amendment has
not.” 279 Without direct and unambiguous scientific evidence of harm
caused by SOCE, the ordinances simply represented the “majority
preference,” as reflected by the views of professional mental health
associations such as the APA, that SOCE are wrong. 280 The First
Amendment, Judge Grant opined while perhaps unsurprisingly
quoting from Justice Scalia’s opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul in
276. See Rebecca R. Ruiz & Ben Protess, Trump Nominee Is Among Judges
Opposed to Banning Membership in Conservative Group, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 5,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/03/us/politics/judges-federalistsociety.html [https://perma.cc/578T-MRMX].
277. See id.
278. See U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BRITT CAGLE GRANT
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINEES at 3.
279. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 870 (11th Cir. 2020).
280. See id. at 869.
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the process, stands as a formidable bulwark against allowing
majoritarian viewpoints to squelch those who hold minority positions
regarding topics such as homosexuality. 281
With Brown’s demanding evidentiary standard for strict
scrutiny rendering moot both the scientific evidence and the opinions
of learned organizations against SOCE, Otto boiled down to being, at
least for the majority, a case about protecting offensive speech—
namely, conversion therapy—from government censorship. Judge
Grant made this exceedingly evident when she quoted the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in the flag-burning case of Texas v.
Johnson for the proposition that “‘[i]f there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.’” 282 The actions of Boca Raton
and Palm Beach County violated that principle, Judge Grant
concluded. 283
The bottom line is that the Otto majority’s Brown-like
approach to assessing evidence plowed a path—by pushing aside
scientific studies and professional associations’ opinions—for
making Otto, for the majority, a case about protecting dissenting and
unpopular speech rather than a dispute about safeguarding minors
from harm. Nine years after Brown’s evaluative methodology was
established in the context of a case about shielding minors from harm
supposedly wrought by playing fictional, entertainment-based
videogames, Brown’s approach was stretched to safeguard speech
that attacks gay and bisexual minors’ sexual orientation. 284 Viewed
most critically and writ large, Brown’s formula for evaluating
evidence now has become another First Amendment-based means of
facilitating a deregulatory agenda by conservative-tilting jurists in
the cultural and legal wars over gay rights, not simply a tool for
objectively evaluating scientific evidence.

281. See id. (“But that is, really, just another way of arguing that majority
preference can justify a speech restriction. The ‘point of the First Amendment,’
however, ‘is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than
silencing speech on the basis of its content.’”) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992)).
282. See id. at 872 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
283. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 872.
284. See id. at 859, 868.
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IV. CONCLUSION

This Article used the Eleventh Circuit’s recently divided
decision in Otto v. City of Boca Raton to explore contrasting stances
about evaluating scientific evidence of harm caused by speech, as
well as the level of deference that should be afforded to the opinions
of learned professional associations and lawmakers. Those
conflicting positions, as this Article explained, were first evinced
nearly a decade earlier by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass’n. 285 This Article illustrated how the Otto majority’s assessment
of scientific evidence closely tracked that of Justice Scalia and the
majority in Brown, while Judge Martin’s logic in her Otto dissent
more closely paralleled the holistic, deferential, and flexible
methodology adopted by Justice Breyer in Brown. 286 Much more,
however, was at stake in Otto than simply the ability of minors to
rent and purchase violent video games. In particular, the ability,
autonomy, and dignity of gay and bisexual minors to be free from the
inefficacy and alleged harms stemming from the speech-based
practice of SOCE was front and center in Otto. 287
This Article, in critical fashion, contextualized the friction in
Otto between the Trump-appointed judges in the majority and the
Obama-appointed judge in the dissent with similar strains among the
conservative and liberal Justices on the Supreme Court when
lightening rod issues such as abortion and labor unions underlie First
Amendment speech cases. 288 In the process, this Article suggested
how the Otto majority’s adoption of a rigid, highly demanding
standard for evaluating evidence of speech-based harm can be
understood, at least when viewed critically, as another tool for
implementing First Amendment Lochnerism. 289 Embracing a Brownlike analysis of the evidence, while simultaneously ignoring the
285. See supra Part II (discussing Justice Scalia’s majority and Justice
Breyer’s dissent).
286. See supra notes 15–33 and 189–197 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 5–7 and 64–74 (regarding the alleged inefficacy and/or
harmful nature of SOCE).
288. See supra Part III (discussing the friction in the Eleventh Circuit
between the two Trump appointees, who ruled in favor of permitting the widely
condemned practice of SOCE on minors, and the lone Obama appointee, who
delivered an opinion against the controversial practice).
289. See supra Part III (discussing the Otto majority’s use of an extremely
demanding, Brown-like test when evaluating the scientific evidence of harm
purportedly caused by SOCE).
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opinions of multiple learned professional associations that SOCE
may be harmful, allowed the Otto majority to ultimately suggest that
the case was really about protecting dissenting and unpopular
expression (for example, SOCE), not about protecting LGBTQ
minors from injury. 290
Regardless of the political and cultural overtones in Otto,
however, Judge Martin’s recognition of the ethical impossibility of
conducting SOCE-based experimental research on minors highlights
a glaring problem with Brown’s approach to evidence that must be
addressed by the Supreme Court in the near future.291 How, in other
words, can the legal system demand the impossible? Surely greater
deference is due in these instances to the opinions of learned
professional associations.
The Court now has a prime opportunity to consider and resolve
that issue, given the split of authority described earlier among the
federal appellate courts when addressing First Amendment free
speech challenges to anti-SOCE statutes and ordinances. 292 One
suspects that if the Court were to hear Otto or a similar case
involving an anti-SOCE law, the same ideological cleavage that
permeated the cases of National Institute of Family and Life
Advocates v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees described earlier would percolate
up to the surface once again.293 Although it is only speculation, of
course, it also would not be too much of a legal stretch to predict that
the Court’s newest member, former President Trump-appointee
Justice Amy Coney Barrett, would embrace Justice Scalia’s approach
to evaluating evidence in Brown, especially because she clerked for
him during the 1998 term and because of her work with the
Federalist Society. 294 In brief, the specter of First Amendment
290. See Otto, 981 F.3d at 871.
291. See supra notes 43 and 159–161 and accompanying text (regarding
Judge Martin’s observation about this point).
292. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (addressing the split of
authority that Otto creates with the decisions by the Third and Ninth Circuits in
upholding anti-SOCE statutes).
293. See supra Part III, at 18–19 (discussing the cases stated).
CT.
OF
THE
U.S.,
294. See
Current
Members,
SUP.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx
[https://perma.cc/E3DM6N62] (last visited Oct. 11, 2021) (providing that Justice Amy Coney Barrett
“served as a law clerk for Judge Laurence H. Silberman of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit from 1997 to 1998, and for Justice Antonin Scalia of
the Supreme Court of the United States during the 1998 Term”); see also Elizabeth
Dias et al., Rooted in Faith, Amy Coney Barrett Represents a New Conservativism,
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Lochnerism that now haunts anti-SOCE statutes after Otto is unlikely
to disappear in the near future.

N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/11/us/politics/amyconey-barrett-life-career-family.html [https://perma.cc/CX8G-VNGA] (“Raising her
profile further within conservative circles, Ms. Barrett reactivated her membership
in the Federalist Society’s grass-roots network of conservative lawyers, in 2014. She
began delivering more and more speeches, some to the Federalist Society at college
campuses like Indiana University in Bloomington, Duke and Harvard.”).

